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“Nobody talked much as the expedition crossed the moon. There was nothing appropriate to say.
One thing was clear: Absolutely everybody in the city was supposed to be dead, regardless of
what they were, and that anybody that moved in it represented a flaw in the design. There were
to be no moon men at all.” – Slaughterhouse 5

In an apparent state of shock, President John F. Kennedy listened on to his Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as he was briefed for the first time on the most complex, most
consequential, most destructive war plan that a military bureaucracy had ever devised. 1 This
plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan for fiscal year 1962 (or SIOP-62), was the result of
15 years of intense deliberation on nuclear theory and its operational application given a wartime
scenario. Despite the stubbornness of fierce military inter-service infighting and the incalculable
costs of resources necessary to prepare the military for a global nuclear war, SIOP-62 stood
before the new President as a triumph of state bureaucracy manifesting national interests into
reality. Indeed, its contents were unprecedented, and if executed the thermonuclear devastation
of SIOP-62 would drastically alter the trajectory of human life on planet Earth. 2
Given a scenario of a “Fully Generated Alert Level,” SIOP-62 planned for the United
States military to detonate 3267 atomic and thermonuclear weapons spanning from the industrial
centers of Eastern Europe to coastal Chinese cities in the Pacific. At its maximum, this
coordinated air-atomic behemoth would release 7.420 gigatons of nuclear energy across the
Eurasian landmass in virtually simultaneous form, making massive swaths of land uninhabitable
for the immeasurable future. 3 SIOP-62 called for over 200,000 times more nuclear force than the
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combined bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II. Tabulating a precise casualty
rate is difficult, but with what declassified estimates are publicly available, the total casualties of
Sino-Soviet bloc conservatively amounted to 285 million immediate deaths. 4 These estimates did
not consider though casualties caused by firestorms, radioactive fallout, international food
scarcity, or long-term atmospheric alterations, which would inevitably result in the death of
millions more globally. The design of SIOP-62 demanded that each category of targeting was
inseparable from the overall strategy. In essence it was either to be implemented in full or not at
all.
The targeting selection process for SIOP-62 was far from arbitrary. Led by lieutenant
General Hickey, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council conducted a
study which would become known as Study No. 2009 charged with the purpose of evaluating
what type of targeting strategy would be most likely to meet policy objectives. The
subcommittee came to the conclusion that targeting should be an “Optimum mix” of military and
urban-industrial targets. Therefore, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (charged with target
selection for SIOP-62) could use discretion as to what it perceived to be the most advantageous
of both military as well as urban-industrial targets to bring Soviet military capacities to a halt and
ensure the survival of the United States. 5 The approved guidance stated that each target must
meet a minimum of 75 percent chance of destruction regardless of target priority. 6 Through
strategic air bombers and ballistic missiles (launched from both land outposts as well as
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submarines) simultaneous launching of the US nuclear arsenal was designed to overwhelm
Soviet defenses, assure the greatest extent of delivery success, and provide a relatively larger
degree of safety to the bombing teams above Soviet skies. All of these factors ensured hyperredundancy measures be in place by operational planners. Whether they were necessities or
excesses depended on who was being asked, but critical members within the Kennedy
administration found them to be excessive.
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had been briefed on SIOP-62 in early February
and had since sought to prepare an alternative for the moment when President Kennedy would be
made aware of this plan. 7 McNamara abhorred its inflexible nature, the redundancy of its
bombardment tactics, and the whimsical attitude of its creators. “That was the crux of SIOP,”
wrote nuclear historian Fred Kaplan, “a first-strike plan that held back nothing, that killed
hundreds of millions of people just because they lived under Communist rule, without any
Communist government’s having so much as scratched a square inch of the United States. As
much as anyone else who had witnessed this spectacle, if not more so, Robert McNamara was
horrified.” 8 As one who was skeptical of the assessments military officials offered for their own
objective requirements, McNamara set off to tame the aggression within the strategies these
nuclear planners had set forth under Eisenhower.
It did not take long for McNamara to convince the president that any nuclear plan should
be flexible enough to accommodate for the unique circumstances of a potential nuclear scenario.
The Kennedy family trusted McNamara. In fact, President Kennedy’s brother, Robert Kennedy
once remarked, “Bob McNamara is the most dangerous man in the Cabinet because he is so

7
8

Kaplan, Fred M. The Wizards of Armageddon. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991. Print.
Ibid.

4

persuasive and articulate.” 9 President Kennedy shared McNamara’s distaste for the present
direction of nuclear operational planning and trusted that he could correct the issue. So, with the
approval of Kennedy, McNamara quickly began an effort to restructure the rigidity of the SIOP62, and in 1963, McNamara presented President Kennedy with the SIOP-63 which contained
more options of nuclear attack if an escalation of general conflict were to ever arise.
McNamara’s plan unwound nuclear targets from non-nuclear military targets and urbanindustrial targets, allowing the president the flexibility to withhold attack on higher population
centers, and the plan provided the president five primary attack options—determined by the
imminence of the threat—from which, hopefully, he would never have to choose. 10
This deviation from the established Eisenhower nuclear policy of massive retaliation
became known as “flexible response.” Massive retaliation was a strategy whereby the nation’s
nuclear arsenal would only be used all at once and in its totality if provoked by unacceptable
Soviet aggression. Flexible response attempted to offer less apocalyptic uses of the weapon. It
was to be the trademark of the Kennedy administration’s imprint on nuclear policy and it was
perceived by some as a sensible backing away from the brink of the thermonuclear edge.
Intuitively, this change in national policy felt safer. If the Soviet Union was to annex West
Berlin, an immediate and unflinching emptying of the entire U.S. nuclear arsenal seems
excessive at best, maniacal at worst. But the temporary victory of flexible response as U.S.
policy over massive retaliation does not suggest some judicious civilian victory over the
thoughtless excesses of military officialdom nor does it necessarily even make the brandishing of
nuclear arsenals between the United States and Soviet Union any less dangerous.
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McNamara and Kennedy’s logic ignores one looming reality: nuclear attack is, by nature,
indiscriminate. A targeting plan which distinguishes civilian from combatant, innocent from
hostile, bystander from threat requires nuclear weaponry not be used. The close proximity of
military outposts and weapon systems with high population areas raises significant doubt as to
whether Soviet leaders would even be able to discern a “military only” attack from one which
fully integrates urban-industrial centers alongside military targets. 11 In his defense of SIOP-62,
JCS Chairman General Lemnitzer stated: “limiting attack to military targets has little practical
meaning as a humanitarian measure.” 12 The size and scope of nuclear capability by the early
1960’s negated any perceived ethical benefit from an easing of target destruction. Furthermore, if
left unused, it would be likely that most, if not all, of the remaining U.S. arsenal would be
destroyed by Soviet retaliation, leaving the U.S. military with no meaningful response with
which to engage in further offensive action. Even if some were left intact, communication
systems would surely be down, leaving regional command posts isolated to guess whether or not
their superiors desired further nuclear deployment. 13
Furthermore, flexible response also ushered in the worry that the limited or tactical use
of nuclear weapons would significantly lower the threshold from which these weapons were
used. In a sense, this policy might have normalized nuclear warfare and increased the likelihood
that small nuclear weapons be used on peripheral locations or placed strategically in battlefield
scenarios. How the USSR would respond to any nuclear bombardment was conjecture. A low
barrier to initial use could potentially lead to a rapid escalation of hostilities ending in a complete
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nuclear exchange that otherwise would not have taken place. This argument suggests that greater
flexibility might inadvertently have increased the chance of a massive nuclear exchange.
It is as if McNamara and Kennedy believed the Eisenhower administration had neglected
to consider all alternatives by which they might pursue nuclear policy. In fact, nuclear thinkers in
the Eisenhower years had been the most entrepreneurial under any administration prior or since.
As Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Eisenhower had
far more experience with nuclear operations than any preceding president to date. Yet the
attitude of his subsequent administration seemed to disregard the years of strategic thinking that
had allowed for an operational plan like SIOP-62 to become possible.
Despite its ambitions, flexible response would not remain national policy for long. The
entire concept rested upon two major assumption. First that nuclear war could be limited—in
other words the detonation of one or several nuclear weapons would not necessarily prompt the
launching of all Soviet nuclear arms. As previously discussed, this was a reasonably doubtful
assessment. And secondly, that funding civil and military defense apparatuses could keep US
population and industrial levels intact. But as arsenals continued to grow rapidly in the early
1960’s, the numbers just did not seem to suggest that could be possible.
“The calculations revealed that damage-limiting was a fairly hopeless strategy. […]
Under certain conditions, damage-limiting could make a difference of up to 55 or 60
percent in the amount of US industry surviving a Soviet attack. However, if the Soviets
reacted by expanding their own offensive forces, they could completely nullify the
damage-limiting measures—and moreover, do so far more cheaply than it would take for
the United States to limit damage yet again. In the race between offense and defense,
offense would win, and at lower cost.” 14
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What alternations of SIOP-62 McNamara proposed, from a larger picture, did not change the
nature of state nuclear behavior. An intolerable number of nuclear weapons would be launched
that would kill millions in the event of nuclear conflict with the USSR. By 1964, Secretary
McNamara came around to supporting Assured Destruction—which was more or less the policy
that had been in place under Eisenhower. The hope that nuclear weapons could be utilized in a
circumstance that would not wreak intolerable destruction upon the state was dead.
This juxtaposition of SIOP-62 and its horrific consequences against the legitimate
critiques of flexible response illustrates the paradox of nuclear capability. With the advent of
nuclear armed states, what could be defined in a wartime scenario as a military victory for the
first time became incongruous with a political victory. What nuclear tacticians developed within
their war plans could no longer satisfy the objectives of the civilian leadership for whom they
took orders. The ultimate aim of SIOP-62 was not that it be used to successfully win a war, but
that through preparation for nuclear conflict, such a war might be deterred. Therefore, by
examining what these plans detailed, this gap in military-civilian objectives can be best
understood.
As McNamara sought to reform SIOP, a sharply worded Kennedy administration memo
articulated his frustrations succinctly: “SIOP-62 is a rigid, all-purpose plan, designed for
execution in existing form, regardless of circumstances. Rigidity stems from … [the] … Belief
that winning general war means coming out relatively better than USSR, regardless of magnitude
of losses.” 15 The criticism of relative victory regardless of magnitude is legitimate, but not one
that would keep a state from engaging in future warfare. McNamara realized that what
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differentiated a U.S.-Soviet war in 1961 from the Eastern Front of World War II was whether a
nation would be left to rebuild. Even the declared “victor” of a thermonuclear war would have no
real nation left to govern. It would be paralyzed to affect any real measure of power over what
population remained. His actions reflected a larger urge by any state of nuclear capability to
mold nuclear capacities into something that can be managed—an urge that was futile.
While those at the nuclear mantle throughout the 1950s gradually came to the realization
of what a nuclear war would and must entail, Kennedy and McNamara’s reactions to the SIOP62 briefing are so telling because the gravity of this capability was bestowed upon them all at
once. Those preceding the Kennedy administration did not inherent an atomic arsenal capable of
tossing missiles of international decimation through the air. They were the gradual inventors of
it. McNamara and Kennedy’s shocked reaction to massive retaliation was not experienced by
earlier officials because for them the consequences of nuclear exchange were a much more
gradual realization. In this historical moment, we confront the quandary of nuclear weapons.
They deter aggression through the threat of genocide. Yet no rational government could imagine
benefit from their use. Nuclear weapons placed states in a quandary of geopolitical interests and
perceptions of insecurity that persists under the pretense of irrationality.
This thesis lays out the atomic framework, beginning in the late 1940’s under President
Truman through the opening days of the Kennedy administration, from which nuclear thinking
developed. It explores the nebulous relationship between official policy and operational
planning, which so often only reluctantly coincided. In section one, this paper discusses the
multiplicity of ideas suggested by policy officials and operational orchestrators alike in order to
contextualize how massive retaliation became the most advantageous nuclear alternative. Its
describes the dialogue surrounding the objective of deterrence and how it might be satisfied
9

through a variety of nuclear means. Section 2 discusses how massive retaliation and, in turn,
assured destruction continued to be the principal nuclear strategy. The quest to prevail became
mired by the means which prevailing demanded. Estimated casualty numbers rose quietly from
the millions of casualties taking months in a wartime scenario to the hundreds of millions taking
days, if not hours. In only a decade, nuclear arms went from the key centerpiece of U.S. military
force against Soviet expansionism to an institutionalized system capable of jeopardizing human
habitation on this planet. U.S. policymakers eventually came to this realization and attempted to
grapple with genocidal and self-compromising implications.
This thesis broadens the U.S. Cold War nuclear dialogue beyond the interactions of highlevel men or rivalling agencies. By centering my argument in the quandaries of interest
bedeviling government leaders, I stress how nuclear armament restructured the fundamental
behavior of states: their interests and the actions taken to achieve those ends. McNamara’s urge
to seek a nuclear strategy other than massive retaliation was not the first attempt to do so by
policymakers. This thesis will explore those options, weigh their strengths and weaknesses, and
explain how massive retaliation proved more resilient than other nuclear alternatives. I argue that
nuclear capability was more than a tool in achieving state interests, but itself transformed what
United States officials perceived their interests to be. By doing so, I decenter the Cold War as the
functional form by which we discuss nuclear armament—even as my study exists within the
Cold War geopolitical moment.
Through the deliberation of several nuclear alternatives and the rationalization of why the
United States always returned to massive retaliation, I emphasize how the logical problems of
nuclear deterrence transcend that of merely the Cold War, but as an ongoing and ever-expanding
force in shaping state behavior both in terms of domestic and international. The conundrum in
10

which McNamara found himself in 1961 is a powerful anecdote in explaining the complex web
of state interests and nuclear capability which I define as “Our Nuclear Quandary.” Acting
rationally, he still could not come to a satisfactory alternative to massive retaliation and
reluctantly returned US nuclear strategy back to the framework provided under Truman and
Eisenhower. This thesis will depict the alternatives other US officials considered and how the
policy of massive retaliation emerged, gained broad acceptance, and matured into the concept we
now know as assured destruction. Ultimately, I use these deliberations of nuclear capability to
dig into a deeper question: Can a world governed by states reach in the atomic age reach any
nuclear alternative that would not result in the destruction of global human habitation? And if
not, how do we proceed forward?

11

Chapter 1 – The Alternatives

“War does not consist of a single instantaneous blow.” – Carl von Clausewitz

Carl von Clausewitz’s seminal work On War has long been a foundational text within the
educational institutions of the US military. The nuclear strategists emerging from the post-World
War II era were well versed in his ideas on the function of war and why states chose to engage in
this most violent act. His first chapter laid out before them 28 fundamental “truths” of war—one
of them being: “war does not consist of a single instantaneous blow.” 16 But as these 20th century
strategists ruminated in the chilling atmosphere of a global Cold War, they gradually found many
of von Clausewitz’s proverbs to be less and less applicable. In a matter of approximately a
decade, war had unraveled from the neat order of Clausewitzean traditionalism to something far
more sinister and unprecedented. By the turn of the decade, the potential for global war had in
fact became an instantaneous act—decided within hours instead of years. I include this epigraph
as a reminder to myself and any readers that alternatives considered and the opinions held
throughout this tumultuous area must be contextualized in their moment, not ours. Truly no
preconceived manual, nor strategy, nor philosophical text convenienced the “Wizards of
Armageddon” 17 as they set forth a new structure of thought from which we now frame our
considerations of war.
United States nuclear dialogue in the founding years of the Cold War centered upon two
fundamental questions. First, how might the US deter the Soviet Union from expanding
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substantial influence into key regions of US interest? And two, if Soviet expansion cannot be
deterred, how might the United States prevail in the event of a general conflict? Despite a variety
of ideas crafted by the nuclear thinkers of the day, no serious discussion deviated from satisfying
these objectives. Within these two questions though, nuclear weapons took on two distinct
functions: to prevent war on the one hand and to ensure a wartime victory on the other.
Intuitively, it is fairly simple to see how the eventual disconnect between political and military
objectives came to be so wide. This section explores the various alternatives policymakers
considered to best balance the two. While not every “nuclear innovation” is considered in this
chapter nor every significant document for the ones presented, this section provides a basic
understanding of the dynamism of early Cold War strategies in their diversity of potential policy
solutions. Government officialdom was not stagnant. It deliberated a plethora of alternatives
regarding nuclear behavior. This reality makes their eventual nuclear conclusion that much more
telling as to how state interests are shaped and how far states are willing to maintain these
interests.

** ** Symmetrical & Superior Mobilization ** **

In the late 1940’s and early ‘50’s, the United States was still coming to terms with its new
adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. Changing global political circumstances
necessitated changes in policy options to follow suit. What I have dubbed “symmetrical &
superior mobilization” was one of those policies, which for a brief moment was adopted by
President Truman as official policy. Symmetrical and superior mobilization is a geopolitical
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strategy where at ever avenue a nation’s adversary may gain a strategic advantage, the nation in
question meets it with equal or greater military capability. In no branch of military or civilian
service would the nation allow its adversary to have numerical or technological advantage, and
also insist that in several, it maintain a clear advantage. Given an environment of insecurity, the
US officials fell susceptible to this policy, if only briefly, as they adjusted to the US’s new
international tension with the communist sphere.

NSC 68

Between 1949 and 1950, a slew of unexpected military actions in Eurasia caused U.S.
officials to reevaluate the rather cautious US foreign policy that had existed since the end of
World War II. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party over the Guomindang in China, the
detonation of a thermonuclear device by the Soviets, and, most importantly, the outbreak of the
Korean War produced a sense of insecurity in the U.S. that would result in a significant
repositioning of U.S. global strategy. 18 The Truman administration viewed the Communist
world to be increasingly aggressive and an imminent threat to American hegemony in the
postwar world. It is in this context that in 1950 President Truman adopted NSC-68 as official
U.S. policy—believing every advance of communist influence must be met with an equal or
greater force from the Western sphere.
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NSC-68 merged Communist policy and atomic policy into the same document—which
had previously necessitated separate, if overlapping, consideration. This document recognized
the intersectionality of the Communist threat and nuclear armament, and it advised an immediate
and wholesale expansion of the non-nuclear branches of the military. NSC-68 envisioned an
expanded nuclear stockpile but it also intended to walk back U.S. geopolitical dependence upon
a nuclear deterrent—seeing such a strategy as ultimately inadequate. “In time the atomic
capability of the U.S.S.R. can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and no more
effective opposition than we now have programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack
cannot be excluded.” 19 Essentially, this document assessed the objectives of prior US foreign
policy—which feared fiscal ruin of military buildup swelled to unsustainable proportions—to be
inadequate for achieving a sound Soviet deterrent. NSC-68 evaluated Soviet progress in
nuclearization and deemed that by 1954 a surprise nuclear attack by the Soviets would wreak
unacceptable damage upon the United States. Despite the fact that U.S. capability could inflict
similar, if not more, damage upon the Soviet sphere, it assessed that while a “moral” nation like
the United States might be hesitant to initiate an unprovoked and whole-scale attack, the Soviet
Union could not be trusted to do the same. Therefore, the project of deterrence must expand
beyond air power and atomic dominance. Only a total military buildup, it argued, could prevent
such an attack from occurring. 20
The ultimate objective of NSC-68 though was the same as previous nuclear strategy—the
relative reduction of the Soviet’s power and influence, which was deemed a threat to peace and
global stability. What differentiated NSC-68 from prior official policies is its assessment of
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resources needed and the immediacy of their utilization to ensure that these objectives were
successfully met. NSC-68 rationalized a hurried implementation of military-industrial strength,
proposing an expansion of every avenue of military force— “air, ground, and sea strength,
atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses.” 21 The approval of this policy by the Truman
administration admitted the inability, or unwillingness, to pursue armament reduction strategies.
It depicted the Soviet regime as calculating, opportunistic, and only responsive to force.
Therefore, it concluded that the United States must provide force—in every sense of the word—
to contain and negate Communist encroachment. No caution must be taken, no expense withheld
to combat the United States’ most formidable adversary. This document’s power rested in its
grave assessment: the conflict which the U.S. found itself in was one in which “the survival of
the free world is at stake.” 22 Therefore, it could demand any sacrifice, consider all alternatives in
order to ensure the survivability of the the state.
More so than any other alternative nuclear policies discussed in this chapter,
NSC-68 and its call for superior mobilization was the most seriously considered policy until the
achievement of nuclear parity. The importance of NSC-68 was not its long-lasting administrative
approval. In fact, President Eisenhower would insist policy reassessment at the beginning of his
administration only 3 years later. NSC-68 was a watershed moment in U.S. Cold War policy
because of how it reshaped presidential and congressional perceptions of American interests
beyond its borders. It emphasized the necessity for the U.S. to be an undoubted “global
guarantor” 23 to the free world. While previous NSC directives allowed for geopolitical margin,
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NSC-68 concluded that any advancement by the Soviet hegemonic sphere would be in direct
defiance to American global interest. It states: “any substantial further extension of the area
under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to
confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled.” 24 NSC-68 also determined that
any failure in achieving an eventual international control of atomic energy was a failure of Soviet
accommodation. This document provided no discussion as to how the United States would
equally engage in compromise to achieve such ends. It concluded that “it is impossible to hope
than an effective plan for international control can be negotiated unless and until the Kremlin
design has been frustrated to a point at which a genuine and drastic change in Soviet policies has
taken place.” 25 Essentially, this document did not take seriously the option of a jointly
recognized international authority to oversee atomic energy. NSC-68 organized the world into
two mutually incompatible camps—pro-democratic and pro-communist—denying any
semblance of nuance or of legitimate diplomatic dialogue. Despite its brevity of official
approval, it removed the lid on congressional military funds for decades to come and it left an
expectation upon several presidential administrations that no inch of influence—no matter how
peripheral the country or how unthreatening its capacities may be—nothing could be forfeited to
any communist regime.
The effects of the Korean War necessitate a brief digression to discuss its relationship
with NSC-68. Beginning in 1950, real military purchases increased from $59.8 billion USD to
$189.2 billion USD in 1953, the years of the war’s end. 26 Certainly, to argue that the influence
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of NSC-68 objectives was the decisive factor in this mobilization would be absurd. Yet after the
Korean armistice had been signed, military budgets only slightly decreased from their mobilized
peak in 1953. Throughout the 1950’s real military purchases remained steady at around $150
billion USD—only around 20% lower than the wartime peak and over 250% the budget of
1950. 27 For this reason, I argue that the national objectives as stated in NSC-68 held a longlasting influence on the nature of governmental Cold War paradigms. The Korean War “proved”
(to the perception of many) NSC-68’s tone of urgency and imminence, even if its conclusions
were unsustainable. This coupling of the Korean War and NSC-68 inculcated the military
apparatuses of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations with a unending sense of tacit
anxiety. With only minor fluctuations in the post-Korean military budgets, nuclear stockpiles
rose from 369 weapons in 1950 to 27,000 by 1962 28—far above their Soviet counterparts and
based in the assumption that relative military superiority provided the most viable option for
long-term security.
Still, administrative officials continually feared a loss of atomic supremacy. John Lewis
Gaddis, an historian of Cold War history, summed up NSC-68 thusly: “Beginning with a
perception of implacable threat and expandable means, [NSC-68] derived a set of interests so
vast as to be beyond the nation’s political will, if not theoretical capacity, to sustain.” 29 The
reoccurring insecurity evident in American foreign and nuclear policy throughout the Cold War
can trace their origins back to this NSC directive. By questioning the long-term survivability of
the United States, NSC-68 drove U.S. officials to conclude that an examination of the deeper,

27
Higgs, Robert. "U.S. Military Spending In The Cold War Era: Opportunity Costs, Foreign Crises, and Domestic
Constraints." Cato Institute (1987): Oxford University Press, 30 Nov. 1988. Web.
28
Holloway, David. "18 -- Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962." The Cambridge
History of the Cold War. Vol. 1. Cambridge UP, 2010. 376-97. Print.
29
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security
Policy. New York: Oxford UP, 1982. Print.

18

moral consequences of military expansionism would be a futile endeavor. Fear was the
foundational tenet of superior mobilization. It demanded the prioritization of military strength
above all other considerations because it placed national demise as mobilization’s singular
alternative. While this policy did not garner large enough support to be sustained throughout the
era of nuclear stockpiling, the anxieties it induced persisted long after nuclear parity was
reached.

** ** The Prevent Strike Temptation ** **

As weapon systems and mutual distrust gradually built between the United States and the
Soviet Union throughout the 1950’s, so too did the allure of a first strike option. The fear of an
obsolete nuclear arsenal caused by an unexpected Soviet nuclear strike situated the first strike
concept for some US officials as a tempting possibility. Needless to say, neither the US nor the
USSR enacted this alternative as official policy, but nevertheless the deliberation of its merits is
worth consideration. Why it was considered, in what circumstances, and how it never came to be
implemented are necessary questions to discuss in order to better understand how a nuclear state
behaved during the Cold War and how it perceived its interests and threats to those interests.
This section will discuss the study “Project Control” as a catch all in understanding the broader
arguments for prevents strikes—as many others did exist. The anxieties surrounding this moment
in nuclear posturing are telling as to what motivates a state to consider a first nuclear strike.

19

Project Control – 1953

Test-confirmed atomic capability had existed in the United States since 1945. The
Soviets followed suit shortly thereafter in 1949. While atomic power was certainly menacing in
its own right, but before the invention of thermonuclear capability, atomic arsenals and the inputs
required for them were viewed as a highly scarce resource. Without the invention of the
thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bomb, atomic arsenals could, at their greatest, only maintain a
fraction of the arsenals seen at the height of nuclear stockpiling in the 1960’s. This was due to
the limited occurrence of radioactive minerals in the natural world—specific isotopes of uranium
and plutonium—capable of facilitating the nuclear chain-reaction for fission to occur. But the
theoretical concept of a fusion-based (thermonuclear) weapon would both yield far greater
explosive capabilities as well as remove the scarcity limits for weapons production. On the basis
of this technological achievement alone, the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race drove arsenals into
the tens of thousands of weapons within a matter of years.
In 1952, perceiving a formidable and continually strengthened foe in the USSR and its
Communist allies, the United States detonated its first thermonuclear device. Not to be outdone
and to the astonishment of many, the Soviet Union detonated its first semi-thermonuclear
weapon only 10 months later. Thus began an exponential scramble to acquire the most menacing
arsenals and the most allusive means of transporting them. These developments transformed the
landscape of deterrence. While relative military superiority had played a role in military
deterrence since as early as 1945, never had it become so acute as it was upon the emergence of a
circumstance of two, dueling thermonuclear states. US officials recognized the necessity of
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relative strength and some came to the conclusion that preventive action was necessary to ensure
US advantage was never to be lost.
These anxieties are evident in a major study conducted by the Air Force College in 195354, titled “Project Control.” This study stated that in its current technological state, the US Air
Force could seize Soviet airspace and attempt to coerce state behavior towards US interests. If
non-violent measures could not achieve these ends, Project Control called for escalated “air
pressure” involving strategic military targeting and potentially general warfare. The study
concluded that the United States through air dominance could neutralize an attempted Soviet
offensive through counteroffensive measures—wiping out key military targets primarily focused
on Soviet long-range capabilities—but that this was not its first objective. 30 The study was both
audacious in its assessment of what the Air Force was capable of accomplishing as well as
insistent in its determination of how quickly such a policy must be put into place. 31
This thesis considers several wartime plans throughout the Truman, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy administrations given a hypothetical breakout of war, but Project Control is not one of
those. For one, this plan came from an unconventional source of legitimately debated policy and
operational planning. This document originated in the Air Force College before making its way
into the upper echelons of Air Force command and beyond into broader circles of policy
decision-making. 32 Secondly, this was not merely a responsive plan to unpredictable conflict
escalation, but a call for such escalation on the part of the United States—and to do so
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immediately. While controversial, this call for preventive action had vocal support even within
the JCS. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, was a staunch
proponent of Project Control. Upon being briefed of its proposals he stated: “If the US did not
adopt and successfully follow through on a course of action similar to Project Control that in the
period mid 1957-1960 there would be either an all-out atomic war or the US would be forced
into an agreement which would mean victory for the USSR.” 33 Clearly, an attitude of nuclear
urgency took root in the minds of some military, if not also civilian, officials. Without the
resolve to act decisively, some feared that the eventual nuclear stalemate, correctly predicted by
state officials, could galvanize Soviet political disposition into an increasingly aggressive
demeanor. NSC & JSC memorandums are littered with predictions of dark future days where the
United States would be given its most feared dilemma: global retraction from the world’s most
contentious events or acceptance of nuclear war. Avoiding this ultimatum was the main
motivation behind calls for proactive measures. While not explicitly using the term “preventive,”
the language Admiral Radford and the JCS put forth before the National Security Council
implied such actions. Often the words “dynamic” or “positive” were used instead in order to not
directly confront the president’s established policy that preventive war not be used, but this
strategically placed language was code for military action. One JSC memorandum in November
of 1954 exemplifies this circuitous language well:
The non-Communist world, if it takes positive and timely dynamic countermeasures,
presently has ample resource to meet this situation, and with high change of maintaining
world peace without sacrifice of either vital security interests or fundamental moral
principles, or in the event of war being forced upon it, of winning that war beyond any
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, failure on the part of the free world and particularly
of the United States to take such timely and dynamic action could, within a relatively
short span of years, result in the United States finding itself isolated from the rest of the
33
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free world and thus placed in such jeopardy as to reduce its freedom of action to two
alternatives—that of accommodation to Soviet designs or contesting such designs under
conditions not favorable to our success. 34
Such indirect language was employed by officials in favor of preventive strikes, rather
than explicitly demanding such actions be taken—a demand in contradiction with the
Commander-in-Chief’s official policy. Locating recorded documentation advocating for
preventive action is difficult, but this should not be interpreted as though its existence was
tenuous. As David Alan Rosenberg put it: “Although seldom explicitly discussed in writing,
preventive war was implicit in some of the major policy deliberations of the time.” 35 Language
and tone became often the means of supporting preventive action rather than explicit verbiage.
Overt support for preventive action was too controversial of a stance to be debated outside the
shadows of ambiguity.
This is not to say though that Eisenhower was resolutely against preventive attack from
the outset of his administration until the end. Several sources have him quoted throughout his
administration as giving preventive action serious consideration. 36 But never did the National
Security Council feel as if this ultimate nuclear posturing was necessary—that is the more innate
mechanisms of the state did not ever reach a plurality of consensus that preventive action was the
most advantageous route. Indeed, the BNSP update of 1956 unambiguously rejected preventive
action: “The initiation by the United States of preventive war to reduce Soviet or Chinese
Communist military power is not an acceptable course either to the United States or its major
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allies.” 37 Upon the achievement of nuclear parity this debate subsided, yet the discussion of
whether preventive action in more regional geopolitical circumstances still remains.

** ** The Argument for Finite Deterrence ** **

The emergence of finite deterrence in the late 1950’s as a viable policy alternative can be
explained in terms of technological advancement in ballistic missile systems, genuine interest in
slowing the seemingly exponential growth of the US nuclear arsenal, and the organizational
interests of the Navy in absorbing nuclear control away from the Air Force’s monopoly . Navy
officials hypothesized a diminishing utility of deterrence in regards to nuclear weaponry as
stockpiles grew, and therefore, a theoretical maximum to the number of useful weapons needed
to deter the Soviet Union from a first strike possibility. This theory was expressed in their
concept of “finite deterrence.” Finite deterrence attempted to frustrate the established Air Force
planning procedure of targeting Soviet military outposts, called “counterforce” targets, which Air
Force officials argued was necessary in order to maintain the possibility of a first strike victory.
But this strategy also meant that the greater number of military outposts, the greater number of
weapons needed to neutralize the potential enemy threat which continued down a vicious and
fiscally irresponsible cycle—hence the Navy’s criticism of what they deemed to be “infinite”
deterrence. Their theory of finite deterrence supposed that given a sizable, but finite, number of
weapons prepared to strike via mass bomber raids, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
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and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) spanning so great an expanse of geography
in such inconspicuous delivery systems, no Soviet attack could destroy the bulk of the US
nuclear arsenal. This would mean that US would always maintain the capability of launching a
retaliatory attack of such strength that the Soviets would deem its impact to be intolerable, hence
reaching a state of deterrence.
It is of little surprise though that advocates and opponents regarding this idea fell sharply
along organizational lines—the Navy and Army for and the Air Force against. If implemented,
this policy would substantially boost Naval prominence in implementing the national nuclear
agenda. The emergence of the Polaris program in the late ‘1950’s and early ‘1960’s—a naval
program which outfitted US submarines with nuclear-capable ballistic missiles—was a key
component in ensuring the success of finite deterrence. Submarines were nearly impossible to
track regularly while high-altitude aircraft or satellite reconnaissance could locate many of the
land-based nuclear deployment outposts. Therefore, capping the requirement of nuclear arms
would end the Air Force’s long-enjoyed position as the chief vehicle of nuclear transportation.
The preponderance of SAC (the Strategic Air Command charged with transporting the bulk of
nuclear weapons to their designated targets) would be greatly reduced and the prestige of the
entire Air Force military branch would be diminished—eclipsed by the latest advances in
submarine technology. In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not weigh each alternative, especially
finite deterrence, disinterestedly. The prestige of their respective occupational branch was at
stake.
Finite deterrence by no means was certainly not without controversy, and Air Force
officials did all that they could to highlight its drawbacks. For one, it admitted that nuclear war
could not be won, instead asserting that “sufficiency or stalemate” of nuclear destruction was all
25

that was necessary. 38 For the Navy, “winning” a nuclear war was neither the ultimate objective
nor even a possible scenario considering the size and scope of nuclear destruction capable by the
late 1950’s. 39 In their assessment, nuclear war would wreak intolerable devastation upon all
parties. In a 1957 memo circulated amongst top Navy officers, Rear Admiral Roy M. Johnson
described this discrepancy of military branches as to what the their ultimate goal even was:
“It has gradually become evident, as perhaps it should have from the start, that the basic
disagreement [among the Joint Chiefs of Staff] is over objectives at that echelon where
national security is defined, rather than over military means once specific tasks are
assigned. This is not to say that indictment of SAC’s plans and demands on specific
military points is not justified, but that it is somewhat aside from the main point. It seems
evident that since deterrence of general war and maintenance of US security and values
are the basic objectives, preparedness to fight and win a general war must subordinate
itself to these objectives.” 40
What Rear Admiral Roy M. Johnson was deliberating in this memo was what ultimately
did the United States’ government deem to be its higher priority: deterring war or ensuring
victory? SAC and other Air Force officials believed ensuring victory to be their highest priority,
and more importantly, still believed victory to be an attainable objective. The Navy thought
otherwise—if only for the convenience of their own interests.
But the Navy’s somber assessment of US capabilities does not signify necessarily a more
humane nuclear approach. Chief Naval Officer Admiral Arleigh Burke described finite
deterrence as follows: “Our objectives can be assured by the selection of a target system which
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will include the most vulnerable and essential elements of Soviet life; that is, the control
structure of their government and the Communist Party, and the industrial complex which is the
foundation of their national power.” 41 Such a targeting system essentially called for the explicit
targeting of cities which ironically the Air Force sought to avoid. Proponents of finite deterrence
concluded that capping weapons necessitated that those being employed would crumble Soviet
urban-industrial areas with little discrimination. This was so because the theory preferred
deterrence over military victory. Instead of locating and targeting the growing number of Soviet
military instillations, which would result in the continued growth of US weapons, finite
deterrence could be finite because it targeted the heart of Soviet urban existence.
But despite the theoretical promise of finite deterrence, it arrived for discussion in the
NSC at the poorest of times. Nuclear production in the United States began exponential growth
around 1955. Whereas the US warhead count stood liberally at 2,000 in 1955 by 1960 that
number stood at around 20,000—a 1,000 percent increase. 42 Also, the US Congress was
entrenched in a (what turned out to be illusory) fear that the Soviets held a considerable margin
of bombers and then missiles over the United States. The national political climate was not
conducive to a national policy that would ostensibly cap nuclear weapons production when the
most immediate concern was that in fact atomic numbers may be too low. 43 Coupled with the
reality that no real humanitarian argument could be made in support of this policy, the theory of
finite deterrence largely remained that—a theory. It would remain an unattainable fantasy for
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Army and Navy officials until atomic parity was reach in the following decade, which by that
point the fiscal argument behind finite deterrence was essentially benign. With the Polaris
program, Navy officers had found other ways to once again assert their influence in nuclear
policy and therefore no longer needed finite deterrence to prop up their strategic importance. In
sum, finite deterrence was a theoretically possible alternative. Propped up by military
opportunism it was given considerable attention toward the latter half of the 1950’s, but
ultimately the political context of the day ensured it would not be held up to oppositional
scrutiny. The navy found other avenues from which it would assert its importance leaving finite
deterrence to fade from serious consideration moving forward.
In summary, this chapter has explored a portion of the alternative strategies considered,
but never entirely implemented, during the founding years of the Cold War. Through the
evaluation of their strengths, weaknesses, and uncertainties, I have provided some understanding
as to what US officials considered to be the ultimate aims of nuclear policy and also what risks
were unacceptably burdensome. These alternatives—Symmetrical & Superior Mobilization,
Prevent Strike, Finite Deterrence—were deliberated as another nuclear strategy maintained
supremacy. Just as SIOP-62 and its theoretical premise of Assured Destruction seem puzzling
when viewed in a vacuum, it is crucial to understand the evolving strategy which placed the
United States in a position to make that wartime plan feasibly usable. This chapter has explored
the alternatives that now belong in the nuclear waste bin. In the following chapter I will explore
the strategy that morphed into something far different from its intended design, but nevertheless
maintains a definable continuity from the arms race’s earliest days under Trumane through its
darkest hours under Kennedy.
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Chapter 2 – The Path to Assured Destruction

"Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily
or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended
to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group." 44 – United Nations’ definition on genocide

To label an action or the potentiality of an action as genocidal as we see it is not the role
of a historian. Yet it very well may be the role of a historian to understand how a state or body of
states came to collectively agree upon a common definition of the term and then reflect upon
how that description measures against the behavior of these states. In this regard, one can see
how the definitions of warfare and genocide merged into a murky and indistinguishable blend.
Beginning around 1954 the United States government had reached a capability “to kill
nations.” 45 The incongruity between their public assertions of what constituted as the most
egregious of national acts—genocide—and what they privately prepared to commit were by no
means harmonious. I included this definition not to assert a label upon developing operational
plans and NSC doctrine through the latter half of the 1950’s, but to keep a point of reference
regarding what was considered outside the bounds of decent state behavior, and how nuclear
weapons seemed to transcend these boundaries altogether.
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** ** Securing Victory ** **
The US-Soviet nuclear arms race can be described into two overlapping categories: the
phase in which state officials believed a nuclear war could be won and the phase in which they
believed nuclear war would result in unacceptable losses on both sides. In no one specific
moment was this transition made, rather as the capability of nuclear arsenals matured so too did
the thinking behind their potential use. The overarching objective in this first phase was
acquiring nuclear capabilities which state officials deemed adequate in securing a US victory
given an escalation of general conflict between the capitalist and communist spheres. This
section will elaborate on some of this phase’s key documents. Through an assortment of official
policy statements, wartime plans, and presidential strategies, I will shed light on what drove the
president, his National Security Council, and Joint Chiefs of Staff to a deeper dependence on
nuclear arms for geopolitical benefit and how this narrowed, instead of widened, future strategic
options moving forward.

NSC 30 & NSC 20/4

The first official U.S. nuclear policy report was released in September of 1948 under
National Security Council directive 30 (or NSC-30). This document titled “United States Policy
on Atomic Warfare” was the first attempt to define the role of nuclear armament under
peacetime conditions. Attempts at the United Nations to internationalize ownership of nuclear
research and resources had come to a standstill as the gaps between the US and Soviet proposals
had proven to be irreconcilable. The point of contention was what would be internationalized
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first: the US nuclear stockpile or all global nuclear programs. The Baruch plan submitted by the
US proposed that all nuclear programs be internationalized first, and only then would the United
States relinquish itself of its atomic monopoly. The Gromyko plan submitted by the Soviets
demanded the opposite—that US nuclear weapons be internationalized before it would surrender
its nuclear program to the global community. Essentially, so much distrust existed between these
states that both sides feared a first move might lead to detrimental geopolitical leveraging of the
other. More and more, the US began to realize that future nuclear uncertainties would be settled
among states, not a collective international body. As I attempt to recast the Nuclear Arms race in
a context of Nuclear History rather than merely a Cold War history, the abandoning of
international control was a watershed moment. In no proceeding scenario was global cooperation
regarding Nuclear Warfare been as feasible right after World War II nor will it likely ever be as
simple of a process as it would have in in the late 1940’s. It is in this moment that the Nuclear
Arms Race truly began.
Given the ever-heightening tensions with the Soviet Union, U.S. policymakers were
unwilling to set any limits as to the use of atomic weapons. In fact, this document affirmed that
no such definition would, or even should, be given. To officially establish definitive parameters
surrounding the use of atomic weaponry regardless of circumstantial context would be “a
prescription preceding diagnosis” 46:
“The United States has nothing presently to gain, commensurable with the risk of raising
the question, in either a well-defined or an equivocal decision that atomic weapons would
be used in the event of war. An advance decision that atomic weapons will be used, if
necessary, would presumably be of some use to the military planners. Such a decision does
not appear essential, however, since the military can and will, in its absence, plan to exploit
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every capability in the form of men, materials, resources and science this country has to
offer.” 47
From the earliest days of nuclear policy formation, the long-term viability of strategic
nuclear armament was largely disregarded. This document evinces that official policy served as
an unambiguous removal of limitation upon war planners to pursue whatever action in wartime
scenario they saw fit. Every aspect of the national resources available could potentially be
utilized in order to construct a sound atomic arsenal. Government officials believed the U.S.
atomic monopoly to be the only theoretical deterrent that prevented the U.S.S.R. from further
military expansion. Therefore, to limit its development would be to limit U.S. interests
throughout the world. A policy of unobstructed nuclear armament did not seriously consider the
fiscal or societal consequences of its implementation. While armies and navies necessitated a
period of mobilization before combat, it would not take long before the immediacy of air
domination became viewed as essential in claiming military victory—thereby justifying the need
for air power to be constantly maintained and nuclear arsenals continuously at the ready.
While atomic planning was not to be regulated by the National Security Council, its
general objectives were strikingly vague in the Cold War’s earliest years. NSC 20/4, an outline
of official U.S. policy towards the U.S.S.R. and its communist bloc, directed a reduction of “the
power and influence of the U.S.S.R. to limits which no longer constitute a threat to world peace,
national independence and stability in the world family of nations.” 48 US officials feared the
communist ideology of the Soviets, but more importantly, they took alarm at the expansionary
policy which the Kremlin actively disseminated among regional states. Coupled with impressive
industrial output and the most formidable military across Eurasia, the NSC 20/4 considered the
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Soviet Union to be the gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable
future.
It is at the intersection of these two directives—NSC 30 and NSC 20/4—that the
quandary of U.S. policy regarding the Soviet Union became evident. These documents,
implemented in tandem as U.S. policy, intended to mutually support one another. Yet the logic
propelling each document was counterintuitive to the other. In NSC 30, war planners were given
the authority to enact any means to achieve the objectives of NSC 20/4. Yet the goal of
diminishing the Soviet threat to a level which would “no longer constitute a threat to world
peace” is inherently at odds with increased military capability. A more threatening U.S. nuclear
stance would become the impetus which drove the U.S.S.R. to itself become a greater military
threat. “The growth of a U.S. nuclear capability,” Historian David Alan Rosenberg wrote, “was
largely justified in terms of the need to counter a growing Soviet nuclear threat.” 49 This race of
arms was anticipated by NSC planners, and eventually become a routinely analyzed procedure
by the NSC’s Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NESC). Instead of evaluating US dominance in the
world as it stood, it became the job of the NESC to evaluate US superiority several years ahead
of present conditions—a testament to the fluidity and instability in this era of atomic expansion.
NSC 20/4 stated that Soviet capabilities “will progressively increase and that by no later
than 1955 the USSR will probably be capable of serious air attacks against the United States with
atomic, biological and chemical weapons.” 50 One nation’s dominance was relative to the other’s
vulnerability. Therefore, the objective “to counter” Soviet influence and capability was
incompatible with the objective “to reduce” Soviet influence and capability—both phrases were
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employed in these earliest NSC directives. No serious assessment was given as to how Soviet
armament could be reduced. Instead, NSC 20/4 and NSC 30 focused on how the relative threat
of Soviet armament could be reduced. By maintaining a faster rate of growth in both quantity
and quality of military capability—atomic and otherwise—the National Security Council
believed that the United States security would be maintained. This policy though would
inevitably fail to reduce the long-term threat of Soviet arms. It plotted a course for exponential
growth of atomic armament and unprecedented increases in military expenditures. Intended to be
more than a wasted asset, the growth of these military forces meant operational planning willing
to affect more violence than in any prior military engagement.
The primary importance of NSC 30 and NSC 20/4 was the nuclear paradigms they made
manifest across the U.S. nuclear bureaucracy. Rather than these NSC directives playing a
decisive role in material production of nuclear arms, they served as an expression of the
dilemmas from which policymakers could not escape in regard to nuclear thinking. Their
emphasis on nuclear preponderance justified as a means to diminish “the USSR to limits which
no longer constitute a threat to the peace” 51 enabled military technocrats to be the judges of what
constituted viable nuclear options. Nuclear victory became the business of agencies,
commissions, and commands rather than presidents, cabinets, and councils. What exactly
satisfied the requirement of deterrence and feasible wartime victory became an operational and
technical feat—reducing or eliminating available alternatives for high-level officials. As
historian John M. Curatola concluded: “Due to the lack of strategic guidance from the national
political leadership and with little real understanding of atomic effects, the wartime operational
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influences would dominate nuclear postwar planning efforts up into the 1950s.” 52 Curatola
argues in his book Bigger Bombs for a Brighter Tomorrow that the objectives outlined in these
preliminary directives were not operationally feasible. 53 The value of NSC 30 and NSC 20/4
was the mode by which nuclear armament was to be conceptualized moving forward. They serve
as a convenient starting point of atomic objectives, and a troubling example of how little nuclear
strategy actually evolved.

Offtackle

Upon the release of NSC 30 & NSC 20/4, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began aligning
hypothetical wartime scenarios between the US and USSR with official policy. The JCS had
actually begun constructing these operational plans as early as 1946, but without direction from
the Truman administration or even much information from agencies regarding actual atomic
capabilities. 54 Interestingly enough though, these plans, proposed after NSC guidance was
released, were quite similar to their unregulated predecessors. If anything, the unambiguous
position of non-regulation within NSC 30 and NSC 20/4 emboldened JCS planners to continue
maximizing target potentials and vital atomic resources—pressuring agencies such as the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC) to ramp up their production of atomic weaponry and the Strategic
Air Command (SAC) to acquire the necessary delivery system for atomic bombing.
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Offtackle was the United States’ first politically sanctioned war plan integrating atomic
weapons with conventional air forces prepared in 1949. 55 It was by far the most comprehensive
air offensive list to date with 123 sites targeted. The plan called for five days of aircraft
mobilization—mostly transporting bombers and their equipment to bases in the United Kingdom
but some mobilization in the Pacific-Alaskan region as well. On day six, 211 bombers would
leave UK and Alaskan bases targeting 32 Soviet targets scheduled to be completed within 4
hours of takeoff. Of the 201 bombers departing from UK airports, 112 would proceed through a
Scandinavian route in the North and entering the USSR near Leningrad (now St. Petersburg)
while the remaining 89 would sweep down over the Black Sea before penetrating Soviet territory
Southwest of the Ukraine. In total these forces were responsible with destroying 26 Soviet
targets, while Pacific forces were responsible for six. Given the limited intelligence available, it
was deemed that 60 sites were readily available for attack while 63 targets needed further
reconnaissance. 56 As US forces rolled across currently known targets, intelligence would be
gathered on the remaining so that all 123 instillations could be eliminated.
The second wave of attack would happen no later than 3 days after the first and by day
30, all 123 targets would be struck. By the first three months of combat a total of 292 atomic
weapons and 17,610 tons of conventional bombs would be dropped. The remainder of the plan
covered 2 more years of conflict but became more ambiguous as unpredictable factors demanded
flexibility while the war progressed. 57
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The crucial elements of Offtackle lie not in its immediate operational feasibility,
however. Indeed, General George Kenney of the US Air Force remarked, “It was quite evident to
all … that Plan ‘Offtackle’ was decidedly unrealistic.” 58 Rather it served as a convenient
framework from which future war plans may be derived. First, it is based on the assumption that
war would begin due to Soviet aggression. In so doing, it denied the possibility of a preventive
US attack against the Soviets without provocation or warning and increased the possibility that
Soviet aggression might destroy key wartime resources or disrupt vital communication lines
prior to US mobilization. This was in line with the limitations provided by NSC 20/4 and it was
also the most substantial limitation placed on operational planners. The concept of preventive
attack (mentioned in the prior chapter) was not unanimously opposed by high-level officials
though. General Kenney himself advocated for it, saying that in fact “It would not be preventive
war, because we are already at war.” 59 Nevertheless, at no point did the JCS fully support
preventive war nor did a significant portion of the civilian members of the NSC. Therefore,
unacceptable provocation by the Soviet Union continued to be a prerequisite for Offtackle and
other war plans throughout the remainder of the Cold War.
Second, the language of the plan alluded to a more holistic offensive strategy than
previously devised. Preceding war plans called for air forces to be directed “against” vital Soviet
war making centers, but Offtackle instructed air forces to "destroy" these centers. 60 Indeed, the
JCS approved a memo which stated that Offtackle would be able to “make the maximum
contribution toward disrupting the vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity, force new
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decisions [upon the enemy], and be immediate assistance in retarding the Soviet advances in
Western Eurasia.” 61 The categorization of war making capacities as vital components of the
Soviet threat broadly expanded the urban-industrial centers which nuclear planners may target.
Detectable in previous war plans, but increasingly so in Offtackle, the line between military and
civilian target continued to blur. To be a contributor toward the gross domestic product of the
Soviet Union would in essence be a qualifier of air offensive targeting. This basic tenet of
nuclear planning formulated in the Cold War’s earliest years would be consistent throughout the
nuclear arms race and a fundamental rationale behind the massive scope of SIOP-62 a decade
later. 62
Third, the JCS assembled an interservice committee to conduct a study of the effects of
atomic bombing at around the same time Offtackle was being formulated. Their findings,
expounded in a document entitled “the Harmon Report,” gave further impetus that atomic
weapons must continue to be the chief reliant upon which United States security depends. The
report stated: “From the standpoint of our national security, the advantages of its early use would
be transcending. Every reasonable effort should be devoted to providing the means to be
prepared for prompt and effective delivery of the maximum numbers of atomic bombs to
appropriate target systems.” 63 The war plan preceding Offtackle, entitled TROJAN, called for
the targeting of 70 sites. This amount was estimated to destroy 35 to 40 percent of Soviet
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industrial capacity and cause 6.7 million casualties—2.7 million of those being fatal. Offtackle
though increased these targeting sites nearly 80 percent. 64 Therefore, Offtackle reflected a
growing consensus among policymakers: that a general conflict between the US and USSR will
be determined by the swiftness and scope of atomic utilization. In effect, relative superiority of
atomic yield and delivery effectiveness would be crucial. To continue this embittered rivalry,
more elaborate, expensive, and deadly operational plans would be necessary if the United States
was to maintain its perception of security.

Eisenhower’s “New Look” Policy

With the heightened sense of insecurity that accompanied the Korean War, US officials
briefly adopted the policy of symmetrical mobilization as elaborated in NSC-68. The demands of
this policy would not become permanent, but the military resources deemed necessary to counter
Soviet aggression became substantially more available. As these documents emphasized the
imminence of potential threat and the dependence upon military action at deterring such a threat,
coupled with serious ambiguity regarding how atomic planning should be overseen, they reveal
an administrative atmosphere conducive to military, particularly nuclear, expansionism, and new
state apparatuses to organize and exploit this newfound military potential. President Eisenhower
instituted what I categorize to be the “third phase” of pre-stalemate nuclear policy upon
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assuming office in 1953. The remaining documents discussed will originate from his strategic
outlines.
Under no other presidential administration has the United States held as clearly
articulated of a grand nuclear strategy as under Dwight Eisenhower. 65 Through the introduction
of his “New Look” defense strategy, the onus of Soviet deterrence would once again return to the
U.S. nuclear arsenal. He viewed nuclear weapons as “an essential substitute for ruinous spending
on larger conventional forces” 66 and more ominously that “not just the possession of nuclear
weapons but the credible inclination to use them” 67 would be necessary if this defense strategy
were to succeed. Therefore, it was under this strategy, elaborated in NSC-162/2, that a document
such as the Single Integrated Operational Plan for fiscal year 1962 (SIOP-62) came to be
possible.
Published in October of 1953, NSC-162/2 admitted the eventual stalemate of the nuclear
arms race. It states:
“In the face of the developing Soviet threat, the broad aim of the U.S. security policies
must be to create, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic plenty, conditions under
which the United States and the free world coalition are prepared to meet the SovietCommunist threat with resolution…” 68
The National Security Council feared that in the process of nuclear armament, the Soviet
Union may detect and exploit an advantageous moment to eliminate the threat posed by the
United States and its allies—a preventive attack. Routine assessments of Soviet nuclear progress
were implemented to ensure that “U.S. retaliatory capability cannot be neutralized by a surprise
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Soviet attack.” 69 With the military focus once again placed upon superior nuclear arms, NSC162/2 walked back claims from NSC-68 of an imminent Soviet danger. U.S. officials deemed the
U.S.S.R. to be a rational state capable of assessing the threat to its own survivability if it were to
provoke the United States into a general war. As long as the United States maintained a clearly
visible nuclear potential, the peace could persist—the world could exist with both the United
States and the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future. As statesman Brent Scowcroft once
remarked: “The Cold War was not an acute crisis that had to be solved today; it was something
we had to learn to live with.” 70
This optimistic assessment of U.S.-Soviet coexistence though did pose problems
which are evident throughout the document. If the Cold War conflict was to be a “slow burn”
then the U.S. must form long-term fiscal solutions to an increasingly expensive question: How
might the United States maintain nuclear supremacy for an indeterminate amount of time given a
rapidly rising Soviet nuclear arsenal? From the outset of this directive, the NSC determined the
“Basic Problems of National Security Policy” were “(a) To meet the Soviet threat to U.S.
security,” and “(b) In doing so, to avoid seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermining
our fundamental values and institutions.”71 This worry is repeated throughout NSC-162/2.
Paragraph 40 (b) summarizes the dilemma well: “The United States must, however, meet the
necessary costs of the policies essential for its security. The actual level of such costs cannot be
estimated until further study, but should keep to the minimum consistent with the carrying out of
these policies.” 72 Achieving a minimum cost while maintaining relative superiority were
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counter-intuitive objectives. They were aware that a nuclear arms race, in which they determined
the U.S. must always maintain an advantage, would require massive military expenditures. But
they could not imagine any suitable alternative. NSC-162/2 assumed that the economic strength
of a free-enterprise system could withstand the investment needed to ensure U.S. superiority
until the “achievement of mutual atomic plenty.” 73 Given the “efficiency” of threat these nuclear
weapons achieved in comparison to a buildup of conventional forces, Eisenhower and the
National Security Council under his administration judged nuclear deterrence to be the most
bearable and adequate means of deterrence.
This was not without producing further potential problems though. As nuclear deterrence
came more and more to be seen as the only means of deterrence, the concept of “Massive
Retaliation” began to appear in NSC policy planning. In its own words, NSC-162/2 called for
“(1) A strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory
damage by offensive striking power.” 74 U.S. allied nations in Europe and Far East Asia were
still vulnerable to an unimpeded invasion if Soviet strategy deemed it advantageous.
Recognizing that the U.S. could not practically maintain the military manpower at these
borderland locations as the Soviet Union or People’s Republic of China could, administrative
officials relied on what John Lewis Gaddis termed “asymmetrical” 75 threat—that is the invasion
of any one U.S. ally would result in an unleashing of all U.S. nuclear capability. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles described it this way in 1954:
“We keep locks on our doors, but we do not have an armed guard in every home. We rely
principally on a community security system so well equipped to punish any who break in and
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steal that, in fact, would be aggressors are generally deterred […] We want, for ourselves and the
other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost.” 76
Therefore, the coupling of responsibility for a vast expanse of geopolitical space—from
the Far East to West Germany—and with the obvious dissymmetry of manpower, Basic National
Security Policies maintained a firm reliance upon the unthinkable option of massive retaliation.
This maximum deterrent though only hastened the “fantastic compression of time” 77 which states
might mobilize its resources to wage war. Instead of a gradual and clearly evident mobilization
of military capability, massive retaliation necessitated the immediate depletion of the U.S.
nuclear stockpile in coordination with one another. “Whereas in the past, if [offensive striking
capability] had failed to act, the United States still could mobilize forces, in the late air-atomic
era, it must act immediately to avoid instant defeat.” 78 In this sense, a sound defensive strategy
would be, not the potential for a powerful buildup of military capability, but the sustained
maintenance of the ultimate offensive capability. Within the rationality of NSC-162/2 and its
preceding BNSP updates, a continually revised and expanded operational plans would be
necessary in order to utilize all new atomic resources made available—ideally as a deterrent but
potentially as a killer of nations.

** ** Massive Retaliation ** **
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In the opening years of the Cold War, the use of nuclear weapons was considered a
viable, albeit undesired, alternative. But as nuclear war came to be more and more consequential,
the structure of US policy shifted. War with the Soviet Union would no longer be take years or
months. Assessment of wartime scenarios determined the decisive moments of war to be nearer
and nearer the point of initial aggression and at exponentially higher costs. This section considers
the “fantastic compression of time” that emerged around the middle of the 1950’s, how it was
perceived by US officialdom, and how wartime scenarios responded to these heightening stakes.

“Fantastic Compression of Time” 1954-55

By 1954, the United States’ assessment of Soviet nuclear capabilities suggested an
uncertain future for the US position of dominance. Both states had now successfully displayed
their thermonuclear capabilities, and now only a matter of time stood between their present
moment and the day of “greatest danger” when tensions between the two states—primarily
growing due to nuclear expansion—might reach levels of maximum insecurity. Projections put
this “time of greatest danger of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States [around] mid1957,” 79 only three years forward. The NSC, though, did not believe overt attack would be the
Soviets strategy to expand its global influence. Instead they assumed the USSR would take the
approach of “creeping expansion” as they called it—through subversive action. The NSC
doubled down on their policy that given the outbreak of general war “the United States will wage
it with all available weapons” 80 so as to show no sign of hesitancy to the communist sphere
79
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regarding US means of maintaining its security, and therefore substantial resources were put
forth to maximize weapon and delivery systems availability.
SAC was the premier tool by which nuclear weapons would be delivered to their target
location. In a briefing given to the representatives of all military services at the SAC
headquarters, General Curtis Lemay, head of SAC, described to the other military branches the
optimum plan of US wartime execution. Below is a Navy summary of his report:
“It was estimated that SAC could lay down attack […] of 600-750 bombs by approaching
Russia from many directions so as to hit their early warning screens. It would require
about 2 hours from this moment until bombs had been dropped by using the bomb-asyou-go system in which both BRAVO [nuclear] and DELTA [urban-industrial] targets
would be hit as they reached them. […] The final impression was that virtually all of
Russia would be nothing but a smoking, radiating ruin at the end of the two hours.” 81
Clearly, SAC planners had successfully compressed the moment of decisive action from months
to hours. They determined that given a “Pearl Harbor-style” Soviet attack, between 8.9% to 90%
of SAC capabilities would be destroyed—meaning essentially that they could not ascertain to
what degree a surprise attack would affect the survival potential of their command. 82 This in turn
demanded further readiness and flexibility on the US nuclear arsenal as a moment of
vulnerability in US posturing could result in the unwinding of deterrence and possibly an
intolerable degree of damage against the state.
Throughout this period, regularly updated reports on the extent of potential damage the
US could enact of the Soviet Union were being produced. Constructed in 1955, the Defense
Department’s Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (or WSEG) produced a document titled
“WSEG Report number 12” evaluating this damage and the manner in which it was to be

81
82

Lemay, Curtis. Memorandum Op-36C/jm 18 March 1954.
Ibid.

45

delivered. Report 12 in many ways was similar to previous wartime scenarios. Targets were
separated into BRAVO, ROMEO, and DELTA (or blunting, retardation, and destruction)
categories, and the report assumed that SAC’s “bomb as you go” system was standard procedure.
It was determined that 118 out of 134 major Soviet cities would receive “calamitous damage”
and that “the majority of skilled personnel living in those cities would be lost." 83
When viewed in tandem, these documents represent the beginning phases of US massive
retaliation operational tactic. While nuclear targets would be prioritized both military and
industrial centers would be targeted. The execution of these bombing campaigns would be
swift—no more than 2 hours upon their detection by Soviet radar. The reasoning for this
overwhelming approach to nuclear bombardment was largely operational convenience. This
reasoning was summarized succinctly by SAC commander General Moore:
“Such an all-out attack would provide the largest degree of protection to SAC crews. By
a predominant use of large nuclear weapons, moreover, one crew could be counted upon
to destroy as many individual targets with single weapons, thus achieving a ‘bonus effect’
that was thought to be quite important in view of the many targets requiring destruction
and limited size of the Strategic Air Command.” 84
As these national policies and operational procedures settled in as the new normal for
nuclear planning, undetectable and massively destructive weaponry became necessary to
maintain deterrence. Nuclear war was no longer bound within the traditional limitations of
warfare. No real constraints were placed on what was and was not to be targeted and, if called
upon to act, the US military would make its decisive blows before the day had ended. The era of
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conventional warfare methods was fading from view and the era of massive retaliation became
the fast approaching vista of awe and terror.

NSC 5602/1

As mentioned in the prior chapter, the United States nuclear arsenal stood at 369 weapons
in 1950. 85 By 1959 that number grew to 12,305 and only two years later, as Eisenhower neared
his last days in office, that number nearly doubled at over 23,000. 86 The potential consequences
of an immediate nuclear launch ensured that both the United States and the Soviet Union
maintained ever-ready nuclear systems. Therefore, an unmitigated thermonuclear presence
became the global norm. NSC-5602/1, the 1956 BNSP (or Basic National Security Policy)
update, stated that “because of the increasing importance of forces-in-being in an age of nuclear
weapons, economic and industrial potential for production after war begins is becoming a less
dependable measure of the ability to achieve victory in general nuclear war than in past years.” 87
War potential had become so deadly that wholescale industrial capacities and urban centers of
adversarial states were viable strategic targets for thermonuclear attack. Understanding that their
enemy would also consider these targets viable, NSC officials came to realize the decimation
that their own nation faced in the event of a general war.
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NSC-5602/1 lays out quite accurately how the US-Soviet nuclear arms race would
develop. It acknowledged the impeding shift of weapon delivery from aircraft to a hybrid of
land-based ballistic missile, aircraft, and submarine-launched ballistic missile, and it accurately
determined that the United States would hold an edge in these developments over the next few
years. It also stated on several points, if ambiguously, how flexibility must be allowed into both
location of the nuclear arsenal and the options available for use. The policy states:
“They must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of
malemployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Such forces must
not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that any decision to intervene
against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear
weapons. However, these forces must also have a flexible and selective nuclear
capability, since the United States will not preclude itself from using nuclear weapons
even in a local situation.” 88
Yet the document did not address how to in fact add further flexibility. Indeed, increasing
Presidential nuclear options was an issue which stumped administrations for decades to come,
but nevertheless, NSC-5602/1 clearly stated this as a potential issue not regularly recognized in
prior official documentation.
The policy also hinted toward a looming anxiety throughout the US policy sphere—the
day of nuclear ultimatum where potentially the state must choose between an international loss
of face or general nuclear war. “The United States and its allies must avoid getting themselves in
a position,” it states, “where they must choose between (a) not responding to local aggression
and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue
risks of nuclear devastation.” This remained a chief concern throughout these years as the United
States was not only engaged with its European allies, but in several geographic areas deemed of
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high interest around the globe. Projection of US influence—in all its forms—was regarded as a
necessity so that US interests could remain vivacious on a global scale. This fear was augmented
by the technological advancement that made an all-out nuclear war all but intolerable. “A
situation is approaching in which a total war involving use by both sides of available nuclear
weapons could bring about such extensive destruction as to threaten the survival of both Western
civilization and the Soviet system.” 89 While past policy documents stated that nuclear parity was
a concern in upcoming years, this NSC 5602/1 statement seems to suggests it was now a reality.
Even as the nations’ two arsenals remained asymmetrical, the potential destruction of
both the US and Soviet found the nuclear capability of the other to exceed the acceptable level of
their own nations destruction. All alternatives to inciting such an instance would be considered
before accepting that general war was necessary. Although still primitive in its language, NSC5602/1 began nuclear assessments of atomic parity that would become normative for the ensuing
decades. It admitted how ill-prepared the United States was, or even could be, in defense of a
Soviet nuclear attack and endeavored to find alternatives routes of coercion and influence in
disrupting nefarious Soviet activity. This document is laced with the anxiety of a state stretched
to distant reaches of the globe, determined not to lose that hold, and self-conscious of how a
global retraction might diminish its international repute. In many ways NSC-5602/1 is a snapshot
of transition between the old age of the tolerable weaponized atom and new age of its
unspeakable use.

SAC Targeting Plan for 1959
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A recently declassified SAC targeting plan titled Atomic Weapons Requirements Study
for 1959 reveals the extent and nature of bombing operations that the US Air Force developed
given an escalation of hostilities by the year 1959. Dr. William Burr of the National Security
Archive (or NSA) states that this document “provides the most comprehensive and detailed list
of nuclear targets and target systems that has ever been declassified.” 90 While this document is
only one snapshot of SAC planning among an archive of declassified and still classified SAC
targeting studies, how closely it aligned with the mainstream air-atomic dominance theory of the
day evinces that its contents are not an outlier of Air Force thinking. Some of its specific
targeting categories are unprecedented when compared to other wartime plans available for
public analysis, but this may possibly be due to the continued classification of similar documents
or redaction from these plans’ targeting categories and not necessarily because this is a fringe
study with little support. The breadth of this work suggests that the resources necessary for its
creation would not be allocated if not seriously considered. Likewise, the study claims the basis
of its creation on the authority of a JCS directive SK129-56 and JCS message 399095, 152849 in
March of 1956. It is likely that this targeting list, when compared to the overarching objectives of
war plans prior to and preceding this study and the methodical approach this document conveys
in its targeting objectives and analysis, this list was a normative assessment of necessary attack
locations to ensure what the Air Force deemed to be a US victory.
The overriding structure of this SAC study does not vary the framework of
previous tactic of nuclear delivery. Its most fundamental objectives were to: “(1) Win the Air
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Power Battle by Destroying SovBloc Air Power. (2) Destroy Systematically SovBloc WarSupporting Resources.” 91 To accomplish this the document employed the JCS-established
targeting categories of BRAVO targets (blunting of Soviet counteroffensive), ROMEO targets
(retardation of soviet troop advancement westward throughout Europe), and DELTA targets
(disruption/destruction of the Soviet economic base) to be the basis of target organization. As the
study states, “These objectives are basic and valid,” suggesting no substantial deviation from
former procedures. Upon the engagement of general hostilities, SAC forces would work to
prioritize the destruction of Soviet air forces and air offensive threats. Atomic forces, defense
forces, and tactical forces would be targeted first followed by Soviet bloc air bases, launching
sites and depots, and atomic stockpile sites. Once the Soviet air threat had been neutralized,
focus would shift towards DELTA targets—military and governmental control centers as well as
air industry resources to render not only present, but future air capability paralyzed as well. “It is
here that the enemy’s basic industries are brought [under?] attack,” the study reads, “and the
final blows are brought to bear against his economic base and his remaining government
structure, with attendant physical, sociological, and psychological effect.” 92
The plan called for the destruction of 5975 targets, 938 of which are designated as
DELTA targets, and builds into this plan duplications of target destruction to ensure more
valuable targets have higher probabilities of successful termination. These probabilities range
from 50% to 70% to 90% in likelihood of destruction. The study also does not consider the
effects of thermal or radiation destruction as “both are relatively ineffective compared with
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blast.” 93 It goes on to say “radiation effects are particularly ineffective in terms of time, due to
their delayed arrival and subsequent decay.”
Also, included in this study is the list of every targeted city corresponded by the
categories of intended industrial destruction within each city. This may be the only publicly
available description of what specific targets nuclear bombardment aimed to destroy. The list did
not differentiate between national borders and only differentiated between the three “zones” of
communist control (USSR, Communist China, and Soviet Satellites) in order of priority. Most
ominously, this categorization described “population” as one of several dozen intended
categories of destruction. Virtually every city attacked included population as one of several
categories intended to destroy. The complete targeting list includes well over one thousand cities
from Beijing, China to East Berlin, East Germany in what it terms “systematic destruction.”
Within the five major communist cities alone—Beijing, Leningrad, Moscow, Warsaw, and East
Berlin—this SAC study called for the decimation of 19 population centers. 94 This targeting list
reveals that targets of capital (factories, equipment, etc.) were not the only industrial resources
directed to be eliminated, but that dense sources of labor were also seen as essential in order for
“the final blows [to be] brought to bear.”
The Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959 recasted the nature of nuclear
planning as an amoral operation. Nuclear planners considered congregated sources of labor to be
one cog of the larger industrial behemoth that the Soviet might employ against the United States.
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They determined explicit depopulation as a viable targeting measure in order to achieve US
objectives. In this regard, mass extermination of human life planned by SAC was not a
byproduct of nuclear warfare. Mass extermination was itself the ultimate aim. This study,
seemingly standard protocol for SAC, disregarded international norms of the day and would
potentially have been labeled as genocidal planning. 95 In its opening mission statement, the study
states:
“In the event of general war, the mission of the Strategic Air Command is to conduct
global strategic air warfare in support of US national and military objectives utilizing
atomic and nuclear weapons. In view of the growing Soviet threat to the US and its
Allies, as well as the increasing Soviet capability to launch an atomic offensive against
them, the accomplishment of the SAC mission must be realized through the execution of
[air power dominance and the systematic destruction of the SovBloc war-supporting
resources].”
To be employable, to be able bodied, to be of sound mind—these are the human traits that
qualified Soviets as potential “war-supporting resources.” Just as steel mills and ammunition
factories were vital tools in the Soviet war-making effort, so too were the people who might
operate them. This study revealed how international enmity coupled with thermonuclear
armament demanded a readiness by the state to annihilate any inputs required for Taylorian
manufacturing or the urban environments which made Taylorian manufacturing possible. This
plan went beyond the destruction of militaries or their commanding outputs. SAC intended to
unwind the very fabric of a society. Industrialism and urbanization—the essence of technological
progress—when within the confounds of “SovBloc” control was viewed as threatening.
Countries could be killed. Cities could be sanitized. The United Stated developed these
extraordinary capabilities so that its global interests may be maintained. The Atomic Weapons
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Requirements Study for 1959 is the most honest depiction of nuclear war discussed in this
chapter. The totality of its execution is not explained in ambiguous terminology, but as
calculated statistics. As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara refused to accept the calamity of
SIOP-62 and the rigidity by which it demanded these actions be taken, it was the intended
depopulation of entire nations that moved McNamara to find some other alternative. What
constituted a military victory was beyond the bounds of his own political will. In the end though,
the compulsion towards state security trumped his detestation for nuclear exchange and the
potential for these nuclear atrocities persisted—both in that day and into our own.
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Conclusion

“…the essence of totalitarian government, and perhaps the nature of every bureaucracy,
is to make functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative machinery out of men, and thus to
dehumanize them.” – Hannah Arendt

Once again, I return to the idea of the United States’ nuclear dilemma existing in a
quandary. The opposing interests of the military in assuring a wartime victory and the political
desire for national survival post-nuclear war were not and cannot be compatible. Through this
paper, I have laid out several of the alternatives available to the US government and how massive
retaliation as an operational plan and assured destruction as a national policy remained the
continued nuclear positioning throughout the nuclear arms race. By contrasting a variety of
nuclear alternatives—flexible response, symmetrical mobilization, finite deterrence, and
preventive attack—I have shown how massive retaliation and assured destruction were not
merely presidential preferences, but the most viable option for national survival that, despite
various attempts to enact new policies, spanned across historical particularities, party affiliation,
or leadership style.
At an NSC meeting in 1958, President Eisenhower quipped “…that he could remember
well when the military used to have no more than 70 targets in the Soviet Union and believed
that destruction of these 70 targets would be sufficient. Now, however, a great many more targets
had been added.” 96 Still moments later, he gave his approval of the nuclear targeting of all Soviet
cities over the population of 25,000. In a matter of 10 years the capacities of another general war
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grew exponentially. No longer was it a struggle to dominate one’s military and capture their
cities, but to eviscerate their national livelihood entirely.
While presidential oversight certainly played a role in the guidance of nuclear strategy, it
should be noted how autonomous the nuclear-industrial complex came to be throughout
Eisenhower’s administration and onward. A 1960 NSC memorandum on a proposal to reach a
potential bilateral agreement with the Soviets to cut off of fissile materials production is very
telling to the nature of the larger nuclear capabilities’ system. In this document, President
Eisenhower expresses his deep conviction that some sort of agreement needed to be reached.
“We can't go on the way we are,” he said, “with the nuclear build-up and the spread of
capabilities.” 97 The Defense Department was hesitant to agree—noting the potential
vulnerabilities that could arise from cutting off fissile production for US nuclear arsenals. The
President then said that “the Defense analysis appeared to him one-sided and in a vacuum. It
stressed the effects of a cut-off on the U.S. without looking at the effects on the Soviet Union. He
thought that any equitable arrangement leading to mutual inspection was in our interest.” 98 While
it is an often-said proverb by historians to avoid analyzing an event or phenomenon “in a
vacuum,” the President of the United States expressed concern that Defense policy was often
constructed exactly that way. Deterrence as a theoretical concept was never tied down to a
quantifiable value of measurement that could be broadly accepted. It held different meanings to
the strategist who spoke of its necessity. Therefore, much of the justification for these plans, and

97

Memorandum of Conversation Prepared by Philip Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic
Energy Affairs, "NSC Meeting on Nuclear Cutoff," 18 February 1960, Secret (Note 13)
Location of original: RG 59, Policy Planning Staff Records 1954-1962, box 116, Atomic Energy - Armaments 1960
98
Ibid.

56

the deterrence they ensured, cannot be tied to specific events aside from the initial success of
detonating atomic, and then thermonuclear, weapons.
Nuclear plans were not analyzed exogenously—in that any one geopolitical maneuver
significantly altered the design of nuclear strategic course. Instead, it was an endogenous craft—
the degree which “we” perceive our survivability to be threatened by “them.” The imminence of
this threat rose and fell over the decades, but any change in threat never redirected how nuclear
deployment would function. In essence, those who formed nuclear plans were academics—
economists, mathematicians, scientists—who operated under the loose restrictions of NSC
directives to find the most effective and efficient means to destroy a nation. The studies of these
scientists “were scientific, so it was thought; there were numbers, calculations, rigorously
checked, sometimes figured on a computer. Maybe the numbers were questionable, but they
were tangible unlike the theorizing, the Kreminology, the academic historical research and
interpretation. [One influential scientist] snootily denigrated all such work as being in ‘the essay
tradition.’” 99 Their conclusions were empirical: what degree of target destruction can be
achieved with X number of B-52 bombers? And they sneered down upon those who attempted to
grapple the Cold War as an issue of history, of political science, of unpredictable human
behavior. In many respects, their plans were created in a vacuum—ignoring the unfolding
geopolitical events, neglecting the complexities of how nuclear capability changed state
behavior.
External events certainly did play a role in effecting nuclear saber rattling—the Korean
War as mentioned before, as well as others such as the escalating conflict in Vietnam and the
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Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 became so tense because nuclear warfare was becoming
increasingly likely. The Berlin Crises and Cuban Missile Crisis certainly affected the potential
for the use of nuclear weapons. But these events, in their respect to nuclear policy, should be
viewed as escalations in a pre-determined nuclear trajectory, not substantial deviations on their
own. The Cuban Missile Crisis did not change the way nuclear planners went about crafting
nuclear bombardment—instead it affected the likelihood that these plans might actually be
employed. Therefore, nuclear planning is a frightening example of military strength that was in
fact, at least partially, constructed within a vacuum.
What I have argued is that the nature of nuclear tactic is inalterable. No personal impulse
towards humanitarianism nor hawkish drive for a fully mobilized military can forgo the
dependency upon nuclear weapons for perceived national survival. Yet this very capability is
what has drawn the world to a real possibility of global genocide. When reviewing the final
general war plans approved under the Eisenhower Administration, military commander Harry
Felt commented that considering the global consequences such a thermonuclear bombardment
would unleash, “our weapons can be a hazard to ourselves as well as our enemy.” 100 Using
nuclear weapons had no practical utility for it posed a risk to all of the world regardless of
national borders, yet their disposal paradoxically remained impossible. Similarly, Robert
McNamara said in an interview once:
“…under no circumstances should [the U.S. and its NATO allies] ever initiate the use of
nuclear weapons. I believed it then, I believe it today. Nuclear weapons have no military
utility whatsoever, excepting only to deter one's opponent from their use. Which means
you should never initiate their use against a nuclear-equipped opponent. If you do, it's
suicide.” 101
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If its ultimate utility is to deter other nations from attack, and this deterrence is built upon the
real possibility that they could be used, then is this not an admittance of the futility of nuclear
armament? Grappling with the logic of nuclear weapons is not a finite process. To argue for and
against nuclear weapons, the deterrence they command, and the destruction of their potential,
one would never reach an ending point. It is a cyclical logic that is never resolved or selfsatisfied. With states at the helm of nuclear potential, they will persist in a quandary of military
and political interests, and with the current global ecological system hanging in the balance. As
globalization continues to fracture the arbitrary boundaries that organize what is “us” and what is
“them” let nuclear policy of the past be a reminder of how imagined these to concepts truly are.
States which aim to disregard the security of others in order to prop up the security of their own
will ultimate fail, and leave all the world as a whole worse off. Only as we realize our collective
interest in nuclear weapons as a species—as a living, sentient organism perhaps—will this threat
to our survival diminish, and a new logic of nuclear armament can unravel our current quandary.
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